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Minimizing the Harm
Of State Fiscal Volatility
by David Gamage and Jeremy Bearer-Friend
This report’s primary concern is how U.S. state
governments should respond to the fiscal volatility
created by their balanced budget constraints. Apply-
ing the principles of risk allocation theory to this
recurring problem, we conclude that states should
primarily adjust the rates of broad-based taxes as
their economies cycle, rather than fluctuating public
spending. More specifically, states should raise their
broad-based tax rates during economic downturns
and lower them during periods of growth. This is
because, as we will demonstrate, volatility causes
less overall harm when allocated to wealthy taxpay-
ers than when allocated to poorer taxpayers who
rely on government spending.
Forty-nine states have some form of balanced
budget requirement.1 And even the one state that
does not — Vermont — has generally acted as
though so bound.2 Beyond legal mandates, states
are also constrained by budget-balancing norms and
financial market discipline.3 As state economies
have cycled through booms and busts, balanced
budget constraints have created significant fiscal
volatility. The mild recession of the early 1990s —
which created budget crises in many states — was
followed by strong growth during the later part of
the decade. States used their overflowing coffers to
pass numerous tax cuts while increasing funding for
a variety of government programs. Yet the bursting
1James M. Potebra, ‘‘Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal
Policy: Evidence From the States,’’ 48 Nat. Tax. J. 329, 330
(1995); Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations,
‘‘Fiscal Discipline in the Federal System: National Reform
and the Experience of the States’’ at 37 (1987) (categorizing
the various types of balanced budget constraints).
2See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Balancing Acts: The Reality of
State Balanced Budget Requirements 3 (1996). There is actu-
ally some controversy as to whether Vermont has a balanced
budget requirement. See, e.g., Yilin Hou, ‘‘Budgeting for Fiscal
Responsibility Over the Business Cycle: A Countercyclical
Fiscal Policy and the Multiyear Perspective on Budgeting,’’
Pub. Administration Rev. 730, 731 (Sept./Oct. 2007). Regard-
less, using the broader definition of balanced budget con-
straints provided in infra note 3, Vermont appears to operate
similarly to its fellow 49 states.
3See John Petersen, ‘‘Changing Red to Black: Deficit Clos-
ing Alchemy,’’ 56 Nat. Tax. J. 567 (2003); Steven Gold, ‘‘State
Government Experience With Balanced Budget Require-
ments: Relevance to Federal Proposals,’’ Testimony Before the
U.S. House of Representatives, Budget Committee, Washing-
ton, May 13, 1992, for a discussion of why written balanced
budget requirements may be less important than informal
balanced budget constraints. From here on, this report will
use the term ‘‘balanced budget constraints’’ to refer to infor-
mal forces that lead states to balance their budgets in
addition to the formal legal rules requiring that they do so.
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of the tech bubble in 2001 brought a new round of
budgetary emergencies, this time of even larger
magnitude. By January 2003, combined state bud-
get gaps were estimated at $75 billion to $80 billion,
or 14.5 percent to 18 percent of total state spending.4
In light of that familiar pattern of fiscal volatility
for state budgets, this article addresses the following
question: What is the optimal allocation of fiscal
volatility across state tax and spending programs?
Alternatively, which is more harmful as a response
to fiscal volatility: tax rate adjustments or spending
fluctuations?
As state economies have cycled
through booms and busts,
balanced budget constraints have
created significant fiscal volatility.
To answer that question, this report operates in
the realm of second-best solutions. Ideally, states
would use first-best measures for reducing fiscal
volatility. However, first-best measures — such as
weakening balanced budget constraints or adopting
rainy day funds — are unlikely to be implemented to
the degree necessary to solve state fiscal volatility
problems. Indeed, the magnitude of the fiscal vola-
tility created by economic cycles has been growing
over time. Although we should certainly strive to
eliminate that volatility to the extent we can reason-
ably do so, the question of how to cope with the
remaining volatility will continue to be a pressing
problem.
This report proposes solutions to this fiscal vola-
tility problem in terms of ‘‘ordinary politics.’’5 Ordi-
nary politics refers to when policymakers ask aca-
demics how they should respond to a given problem
at a specific time. During an economic downturn, the
ordinary politics question usually involves policy-
makers asking academics for advice on how to raise
additional revenue or cut spending while causing
the least economic harm. This is in contrast to
‘‘institutional design policy,’’ a term that refers to
when policymakers ask academics how to reform
budgetary institutions and procedures so as to im-
prove the decisions made by future policymakers.
At the level of ordinary politics, economists typi-
cally agree that unstable tax policies — such as
fluctuating tax rates — are economically harmful.
That accepted wisdom can be traced to Adam Smith,
who wrote that the ‘‘certainty of what each indi-
vidual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so
great importance, that a very considerable degree of
inequality . . . is not near so great an evil as a very
small degree of uncertainty.’’6 The popular press and
policy advocacy organizations have picked up on
that notion to some degree, and often chide politi-
cians for changing tax laws ‘‘too frequently,’’ even
when those changes are means of coping with eco-
nomic cycles.7 However, there is essentially no ex-
isting literature comparing instability in tax policies
to instability in spending policies.8 This report rem-
edies the deficiency in the literature by discussing
the relative harm caused by allocating fiscal volatil-
ity to either tax rate adjustments or to spending
fluctuations.
Drawing on principles from risk allocation theory,
the report concludes that fiscal volatility should pri-
marily be dealt with by adjusting the rates of broad-
based taxes (for example, state sales taxes, income
taxes, and property taxes). Compared with fluctuat-
ing state government spending, adjusting tax rates
can accomplish greater risk spreading and thereby
mitigate the harmful effects of fiscal volatility.
Tax rate adjustments are needed
to prevent the harmful effects of
fiscal volatility from being unduly
concentrated in state spending
programs.
Broad-based tax rate adjustments accomplish
greater risk spreading for three reasons. First, state
tax and spending policies are redistributive on the
4Jaime Calleja Alderete, Tracy Gordon, and Jon Sonstelie,
‘‘Much Ado About Nothing?: Tax and Expenditure Limits and
Government Responsiveness’’ (unpublished manuscript on
file with author, 2007).
5The distinction between ordinary politics and institu-
tional design policy is drawn from the writings of public
choice scholars like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.
See Gordon Tullock, ‘‘Public Choice,’’ in The New Palgrave
DictionaryofEconomicsOnline,availableathttp://www.diction
aryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000240. Public
choice scholars typically use the term ‘‘constitutional politics’’
in place of ‘‘institutional design policy,’’ but we avoid that
phrase as legal audiences (understandably) tend to view
‘‘constitutional’’ rules as being associated with an actual
written constitution.
6Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 351 (University of
Chicago Press, reprinted 1976).
7See, e.g., ‘‘Taxing Simply: Taxing Fairly, Full Report of the
District of Columbia Tax Commission,’’ 132 (available at
http://wwww.ntanet.org/dctax/dcstudy.htm) (‘‘One of the long-
standing principles of taxation is that taxes should be certain
and made clearly known to the taxpayers.’’); Arthur P. Hall,
‘‘The Cost of Unstable Tax Laws,’’ 41 Tax Foundation Special
Report 1 (1994).
8A notable exception is Jesse Edgerton, Andrew Haugh-
wout, and Rae Rosen, ‘‘Institutions, Tax Structures, and
State-local Fiscal Distress,’’ 58 Nat. Tax. J. 147 (2004).
However, Edgerton et al. discuss only the macroeconomic
stimulative consequences of fluctuating spending as com-
pared with fluctuating tax rates, ignoring the microeconomic
risk allocation consequences that are the focus of this report.
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margin, and wealthy taxpayers can absorb the
harmful consequences of risk and uncertainty more
efficiently than can the less wealthy beneficiaries of
state spending programs. Second, because revenue
volatility is more than twice as severe as economic
volatility, tax rate adjustments are needed to pre-
vent the harmful effects of fiscal volatility from
being unduly concentrated in state spending pro-
grams. Finally, legal and political constraints pre-
vent public administrators from efficiently mitigat-
ing the harm from fiscal volatility, whereas private-
sector managers are less constrained.
The following argument for minimizing the harm
of state fiscal volatility by adjusting the rates of
broad-based taxes is structured in four parts. Sec-
tion I introduces the trade-off between tax rate
adjustments and state spending adjustments. Sec-
tion II sets the stage for conducting an applied risk
analysis of the optimal distribution of fiscal volatil-
ity by discussing several background issues and
then explaining how risk spreading minimizes the
harm from both risk aversion and planning costs.
Section III demonstrates why more risk spreading is
accomplished by adjusting the rates of broad-based
taxes than by fluctuating state government spend-
ing. Section IV reiterates the conclusion that adjust-
ing tax rates accomplishes more risk spreading than
does fluctuating government spending levels while
introducing additional caveats to this approach.
I. Introducing the Tax Rate Adjustment and
Spending Adjustment Trade-Off
States have numerous policies they can adjust to
cope with fiscal volatility. States can increase and
decrease spending programs, either through across-
the-board hikes and cuts, or by targeting specific
programs. Alternatively, states can raise and lower
the rates of broad-based taxes (such as income,
sales, and property taxes), or of narrower taxes
(such as luxury taxes and capital gains taxes). Or
states can broaden and narrow their tax bases by
altering the scope of what is subject to taxation.
States can also raise and lower license and user fees,
or expand and contract the use of other means for
generating revenues.
States can respond to fiscal volatility by fluctuat-
ing any of those policies, or any combination of the
policies. Yet however it is allocated, fiscal volatility
creates economic harm. The two main reasons fiscal
volatility is harmful arise from risk aversion and
from planning costs.
That individuals are generally risk averse is a
central feature of the economy and underlies much
of financial economics.9 Investors charge a substan-
tial risk premium before investing in volatile assets,
and certain returns are greatly preferred to variable
returns. Fiscal volatility increases the risk and
uncertainty inherent in the economy. As Louis
Kaplow explains, instability of government policies
— such as fluctuating tax or spending programs —
is as much a source of risk and uncertainty as are
changes in the economic climate: ‘‘Whether imposed
by the government, by nature, or by a casino, there
is risk all the same.’’10
Moreover, fluctuations in government policies cre-
ate planning costs for anyone affected by the poli-
cies. Members of the business community have long
complained that ‘‘they cannot make plans if they do
not have confidence in the tax structure.’’11 Simi-
larly, the directors of government programs find it
difficult to plan when they do not know the future
size of their budgets, as do the programs’ benefici-
aries.
Because of factors like risk aversion and planning
costs, fiscal volatility is harmful regardless of how it
is dealt with. Yet some strategies for coping with
fiscal volatility are more harmful than others. In
recent years, most fiscal volatility has been allocated
to spending programs, with broad-based tax hikes
becoming increasingly rare.12 As the following sec-
tions of this report will demonstrate, that allocation
is far from optimal. Contrary to current policy, most
fiscal volatility should be dealt with by raising and
lowering the rates of broad-based taxes.
The rationale for this conclusion comes from risk
allocation theory. Lawyers and economists have
spent decades developing principles for how best to
9Kenneth Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, 90
(1970).
10Louis Kaplow, ‘‘Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of
a Principle,’’ 42 Nat. Tax. J. 139, 145 (1989).
11David Bizer and Kenneth Judd, ‘‘Taxation and Uncer-
tainty,’’ 79 Amer. Econ. Rev. 331 (1989).
12Robert Zahradnik, Iris J. Lav, and Elizabeth McNichol,
‘‘Framing the Choices’’ at 1 (2005), Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities. Note that these figures define tax hikes as
increases in the statutory tax rates and spending cuts as
reductions from projected spending. Nominal spending totals
(as opposed to real totals or spending as a percent of GDP)
were not cut. See also Irene Rubin, ‘‘The State of State Budget
Research,’’ Pub. Budgeting and Finance, 49 (2005) (‘‘One
conclusion from this research is that states that used to use
both revenue increases and spending decreases to close gaps
have in recent years ruled out tax increases, leading nearly
exclusively to spending reductions.’’).
At the time of this writing, it is still too soon to know how
the states will respond to the downturn that began in 2008.
But early reports suggest that spending cuts continue to
dominate tax hikes as the preferred coping strategy. See
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ‘‘New Fiscal Year
Brings Painful Spending Cuts, Continued Budget Gaps in
Almost Every State Reports Update Severe Impact of Reces-
sion on State Finances,’’ available at http://www.cbpp.org/
cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2853.
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allocate forms of volatility, risk, and uncertainty.13
Those principles play an essential role in our under-
standing of numerous policy areas — particularly
tort law and insurance regulation.14 Yet this report
is an original application of those principles to the
fiscal volatility problem.15
Contrary to current policy, most
fiscal volatility should be dealt
with by raising and lowering the
rates of broad-based taxes.
The central normative finding of risk allocation
theory is the principle of risk spreading. All else
being equal, dispersed risks are less harmful than
concentrated risks. Risk spreading can be accom-
plished directly — by allocating risk and uncertainty
across as many individuals as possible or across as
many sectors of the economy as possible. Risk
spreading can also be accomplished indirectly — by
allocating risk and uncertainty to actors who are
better able to purchase insurance against volatility
or who are better able to self-insure through borrow-
ing and saving.
To see why coping with most fiscal volatility by
adjusting the rates of broad-based taxes furthers the
goal of risk spreading, it is useful to make two
comparisons. The first comparison considers the
risk-bearing characteristics of taxpayers as a class
as opposed to the risk-bearing characteristics of the
beneficiaries of public spending as a class. The
second comparison considers the risk-bearing char-
acteristics of aggregate government spending activi-
ties as opposed to those of aggregate private-sector
economic activities.
Comparing taxpayers as a class with the benefi-
ciaries of public spending as a class, it is important
to realize that taken as a whole, state fiscal policies
are redistributive.16 At least on the margin, increas-
ing state taxation by a dollar to fund an additional
dollar of spending tends to benefit the poor more
than the wealthy. Redistributing volatility from the
poor to the wealthy accomplishes risk spreading
directly, because of the simple fact that the wealthy
have more money. Plus, redistributing volatility
from the poor to the wealthy accomplishes risk
spreading indirectly, because the wealthy are better
able to borrow during downturns, save during up-
turns, and purchase insurance from third parties.
A similar conclusion follows from comparing the
risk-bearing characteristics of government spending
activities with those of private-sector economic ac-
tivities. First, it is important to understand that in
the absence of tax rate adjustments, revenue vola-
tility is several times larger than economic volatil-
ity.17 Hence, tax rate adjustments are needed to
spread fiscal volatility more evenly across the entire
state economy, rather than leaving the harmful
effects of fiscal volatility unduly concentrated in
public-sector spending programs. Second, turning to
indirect risk spreading, political constraints limit
the extent to which government spending programs
can save, borrow, or insure, and the extent to which
spending volatility can be efficiently allocated
among subprograms. Private-sector economic actors
are less constrained on those dimensions.
The risk-spreading principle
supports adjusting only the rates
of broad-based state taxes, not all
state tax instruments.
The principle of risk spreading thus provides a
prima facie argument for coping with the majority of
fiscal volatility through adjusting the rates of broad-
based taxes rather than by fluctuating state govern-
ment spending. However, it is important to note that
not all tax rate adjustments promote risk spreading.
Fluctuating the rates of a narrow tax borne by only
13Those are related concepts. From the perspective of
actors affected by tax or spending programs, fiscal volatility
can be thought of as a form of either risk or uncertainty.
Although the terms ‘‘risk’’ and ‘‘uncertainty’’ have distinct
meanings, the differences between them are unimportant for
our purposes. We will thus use the terms ‘‘volatility,’’ ‘‘risk,’’
and ‘‘uncertainty’’ interchangeably. For more on this topic,
see, for example, ‘‘Choice Under Risk and Uncertainty,’’
available at http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/uncert/
choicecont.htm; Arrow, supra note 9; Frank Knight, Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit (1921). When distinctions are made
between the terms ‘‘risk’’ and ‘‘uncertainty,’’ ‘‘risk’’ refers to
when future outcomes are unknown, but when the probability
distribution of those outcomes is known. In contrast, ‘‘uncer-
tainty’’ refers to when neither future outcomes nor the prob-
abilities of those outcomes occurring are known. Id. at 233-
234.
14See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, ‘‘Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts,’’ 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961).
15There is an existing literature analyzing the effects of
uncertainty on public investment decisions. However, that
literature focuses on idiosyncratic risks affecting only a single
government program. The literature does not discuss how
systematic risks — like fiscal volatility — should be allocated
between taxation and spending. See, e.g., Ravi Kanbur, ‘‘Risk
Taking and Taxation,’’ 15 J. of Pub. Econ. 163 (1980); Kenneth
Arrow and Robert Lind, ‘‘Uncertainty and the Evaluation of
Public Investment Decisions,’’ 60 Amer. Econ. Rev. 364 (1970).
16See Neil Buchanan, ‘‘Social Security, Generational Jus-
tice, and Long-Term Deficits,’’ 58 Tax L. Rev. 275, 294 (2005).
17See Alberto Alesina and Alan Drazen, ‘‘Why Are Stabili-
zations Delayed?’’ 81 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1170 (1991). See also
Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, ‘‘Why Is Fiscal Policy
Often Procyclical?’’ 6 J. of the European Economic Association
1006 (2008).
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a small portion of a state’s population would not
accomplish risk spreading. Moreover, on the level of
implementation, not all state taxes can be adjusted
without creating excess economic harm. For in-
stance, fluctuating taxes on capital gains is likely a
poor method for coping with fiscal volatility, because
taxpayers control the timing of when their gains are
realized and are likely to delay their gain realiza-
tions until periods with lower tax rates. In contrast,
timing effects of that sort are a minor problem for
adjusting the rates of state property taxes. A full
discussion of implementation concerns is beyond the
scope of this report, largely because implementation
concerns are likely to differ significantly among the
various states. Still, it is important to remember
that the risk-spreading principle supports adjusting
only the rates of broad-based state taxes, not all
state tax instruments.
II. Setting the Stage for an Applied Risk
Analysis
This section argues that the question of how to
best allocate fiscal volatility — between the public
sector through fluctuating spending, or the private
sector by fluctuating tax rates — should be con-
ceived of as a question of applied risk analysis.
However, a few background issues must be resolved
before turning to risk analysis theory.
To begin with, one of the central premises of this
report is that the question of how best to allocate
fiscal volatility can be separated from the question
of the optimal size of state government. Yet this
premise requires further support. After all, as a
conservative critic might ask, if state government
spending is largely wasteful, and if taxes are ex-
tremely harmful, shouldn’t we allocate volatility
primarily to wasteful state spending while shielding
the private sector from the harmful effects of tax
rate fluctuations?
The conservative critic is of course correct, insofar
as one accepts the assumptions underlying the con-
servative argument. If states tax and spend more
than is optimal, the harm from tax rate fluctuations
will be magnified and the harm from spending
fluctuations reduced. Conversely, if states raise too
few dollars through taxes, and fund public services
below the optimal level, then allocating fiscal vola-
tility to spending will be more harmful than allocat-
ing volatility to tax rates, even ignoring the impli-
cations of applied risk analysis.
Determining the optimal size of a state govern-
ment requires making trade-offs between the excess
burden caused by taxation and the public good
effects and the desirable redistribution caused by
public spending.18 This report in no way claims that
the current size of state governments is optimal.
However, if a state’s government is either too large
or too small, the appropriate response is to address
this imbalance directly. Once steady-state optimal-
ity has been restored, the question of how to allocate
volatility around the new steady state remains an
issue.
This report’s problem of how states should cope
with fiscal volatility is in essence a second-order
question. If one has strong beliefs that states cur-
rently spend either far too much, or too little, those
beliefs will affect one’s conclusions about how states
should cope with fiscal volatility. Yet whatever a
state’s noncyclical level of taxes and spending, that
level has been effectively chosen by the state’s
dominant political coalition. A dominant political
coalition may choose to change the steady-state level
of taxes and spending. But whatever choices a
political coalition makes about steady-state policy, it
must also decide how to allocate volatility around
that steady state. The latter question is primarily a
matter of applied risk analysis.19
As such, the analysis in this part proceeds as
though steady-state levels for taxes and spending
are approximately optimal. Also, we assume that
state spending as a whole is neither a luxury good
nor an essential compared with aggregate private-
sector spending.20 To illustrate, entertainment pur-
chases are thought to be luxury goods, compared
with food purchases. As personal income rises, a
typical individual will spend more on entertainment
compared with food. If the same relationship held
for public goods compared with private consump-
tion, we might want state governments to increase
spending during upturns and cut spending during
downturns.
18See, e.g., Vidar Christiansen, ‘‘Two Approaches to Deter-
mine Public Good Provision Under Distortionary Taxation,’’
60 Nat. Tax. J. 25 (2007); Louis Kaplow, ‘‘Public Goods and
the Distribution of Income,’’ 50 Europ. Econ. Rev. 1627 (2006);
Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki, ‘‘Integrating Expenditure
and Tax Decisions: The Marginal Cost of Funds and the
Marginal Benefit of Projects,’’ 59 Nat. Tax. J. 189 (2001).
19Without quantifying the amount of harm that could be
mitigated by improving the risk allocation of fiscal volatility,
it is hard to know how serious the risk-spreading problem is
compared with the size-of-government problem. Yet there
already exists an enormous literature examining the size-of-
government problem, whereas this is the first report to
evaluate the risk-spreading implications of state-level fiscal
volatility. To effectively analyze the risk-spreading decision, it
is useful to suspend the size-of-government decision.
20For a discussion of the concept of luxury goods, see Paul
Krugman, Robin Wells, and Martha Olney, Essentials of
Economics at 122 (2007).
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Yet there is no particular reason to think that
government expenditures as a whole are luxury
goods compared with aggregate private expendi-
tures. Most state general account spending funds
four types of expenditures: elementary and second-
ary education (36 percent), Medicaid and other pub-
lic assistance (19 percent), higher education (12
percent), and corrections (7 percent).21 Although
those expenditures are probably luxury goods com-
pared with food purchases, they are probably not
luxury goods compared with many entertainment
purchases.
There is no particular reason to
think that government
expenditures as a whole are luxury
goods compared with aggregate
private expenditures.
When private consumption is reduced because of
tax adjustments, individuals can choose the el-
ements of private consumption on which to reduce
their spending. Hence, when taxes are raised during
downturns, individuals should respond by reducing
spending primarily on luxury goods. When public
spending is cut during downturns, program admin-
istrators can likewise respond by reducing spending
primarily on the most luxury elements of their
spending programs. But the process for determining
which government expenditures to cut tends to be
haphazard and political, and public-sector managers
face incentives to maximize the appearance of hard-
ship — so as to fight off calls for further cuts to their
budgets — and thus do not necessarily allocate
spending cuts to the aspects of their programs that
are most like luxuries.22 Overall, it seems reason-
able to assume, at least as a first-order (or perhaps
zero-order) approximation, that public-sector spend-
ing is neither a luxury good nor an essential com-
pared with private-sector spending.
As a final background issue, it is worth briefly
discussing the relevance of fiscal stimulus. Accord-
ing to traditional Keynesian models, governments
should borrow both to reduce taxes and increase
spending during economic downturns (while doing
the opposite during upturns).23 Of course, balanced
budget constraints prevent state governments from
borrowing to promote a countercyclical Keynesian
stimulus policy.24 Instead, for the purposes of this
report, the stimulus question depends on whether
tax hikes or spending cuts are more harmful from a
stimulus perspective when a state economy is oper-
ating below trend.
Although the literature on this question is
sparse, a few economists have argued that raising
taxes in order to increase spending during down-
turns may have desirable stimulative effects.25
Nevertheless, the stimulus differences between tax
and spending fluctuations at the state level are
likely to be small,26 and there is considerable
uncertainty in the macroeconomic literature about
the efficacy of Keynesian stimulus even at the
federal level, in which deficit-financed stimulus is
possible and much larger sums of money are at
stake.27 As applied to the fiscal volatility question,
the stimulative differences between tax and spend-
ing fluctuations should probably be considered a
minor factor in the overall analysis.
Moving beyond the background issues, the re-
mainder of this article analyzes the question of how
states should allocate fiscal volatility as a question
of applied risk analysis. Just as risk analysis theory
in traditional settings asks which actors and insti-
tutions are best able to manage risk and uncertainty
so as to minimize their harmful effects, risk analysis
as applied to fiscal volatility likewise revolves
around whether state spending programs or private-
sector taxpayers are better able to cope with the risk
and uncertainty that would be created by fluctuat-
ing either spending or tax rates. This section will
discuss how the two main risk-related harms caused
by fiscal volatility can be minimized through risk
spreading. The following section will argue that
21National Association of State Budget Officers, 2003
State Expenditure Report at 13.
22See Roger E. Brinner, Joyce Brinner, Matt Eckhouse,
and Megan Leahey, ‘‘Fiscal Realities for the State and Local
Governments: What You Don’t KnowWill Hurt You; What You
Can Learn Will Help You,’’ 43 Bus. Econ. 55, 60-62 (2008);
John Matthews, ‘‘Tax Revenue Volatility and a Statewide
Education Sales Tax,’’ State Tax Notes, Oct. 17, 2005, p. 305,
Doc 2005-17724, or 2005 STT 199-13; David Super, ‘‘Rethink-
ing Fiscal Federalism,’’ 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2562-2613
(2005).
23See Alan Auerbach, ‘‘Implementing the New Fiscal
Policy Activism,’’ available at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/
~auerbach/implementing-new-fiscal-policy-activism.ii.pdf;
Douglas Elmdorf and Jason Furman, Brookings, If, When,
How: A Primer on Fiscal Stimulus (2008); Daniel Shaviro, Do
Deficits Matter? at 205-211 (1997).
24See Super, supra note 22, at 2605-2613.
25See, e.g., Edgerton et al., supra note 8; Alissa Anderson,
‘‘Budget Cuts or Tax Increases: Which Are Preferable During
an Economic Downturn?’’ California Budget Project (2008).
26Glenn Follette, Andrea Kusko, and Byron Lutz, ‘‘State
and Local Finances and the Macroeconomy: The High-
Employment Budget and Fiscal Impetus,’’ 61Nat. Tax. J. 531,
544 (2008) (concluding that the macroeconomic effects of state
government policy options are ‘‘relatively modest’’).
27See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, ‘‘Rethinking the Role of
Fiscal Policy,’’ NBER Working Paper No. 14684 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14684; John Taylor, ‘‘The
Lack of an Empirical Rationale for a Revival of Discretionary
Fiscal Policy’’ (2008), available at www.aeaweb.org/ann
ual_mtg_papers/2009/retrieve.php?pdfid=387.
Special Report
638 State Tax Notes, September 6, 2010
(C) Tax Analysts 2010. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
maximal risk spreading is accomplished by allocat-
ing most fiscal volatility to tax rate adjustments
rather than to spending fluctuations.
A. The Harm From Risk Aversion
The first major harm caused by fiscal volatility
flows from risk aversion on the part of individuals
and economic actors. ‘‘It is widely accepted that
individuals are not indifferent to uncertainty and
will not, in general, value assets with uncertain
returns at their expected values.’’28 Investors typi-
cally consider ‘‘yield to be a good thing; risk, a bad
thing; gambling, to be avoided.’’29 Financial markets
function by trading off between the expected returns
of financial products and the volatility surrounding
those returns.30 When the expected returns of an
investment are volatile, lenders discount the re-
turns, which forces borrowers to pay a risk premium
in order to attract investment funds.
Taxpayers prefer certainty about their future
levels of taxation, and the beneficiaries of public
spending prefer certainty about their future benefit
levels. Regardless of whether it is allocated to taxes
or to spending, fiscal volatility creates harm because
of risk aversion.31
The standard explanation for risk aversion comes
from the diminishing marginal utility of money.32
Individuals generally value each additional dollar
less than the previous dollar, such that having
$2,000 generates less than twice as much utility as
having only $1,000. Consequently, individuals
should and do prefer a 100 percent chance of win-
ning $1,000 to a 50 percent chance of winning
$2,000. Although the two bets have the same ex-
pected dollar value, the second bet produces a lower
expected utility.33
Diminishing marginal utility is not unique to
money. Individuals receive diminishing marginal
utility from nearly all forms of consumption.34 Even
someone who prefers apples to oranges might select
an orange in place of the hundredth apple. And
while food and clothing might be more essential
than entertainment items, the fuller one’s fridge and
closet the more valuable the entertainment items
become compared with additional food and clothing.
In fact, the reason money produces diminishing
marginal utility is that all of the goods that can be
purchased with money generate diminishing mar-
ginal utility.35 At any income level, individuals
should purchase the mix of consumption items that
maximizes their potential utility from monetary
purchases. But as the adage goes, you can’t buy
happiness. Much of what individuals desire cannot
be purchased on the market. The more monetary
goods one owns, the less valuable additional mon-
etary goods become compared with nonmarket goods
like love, health, and the benefits of public spend-
ing.36
Just as the diminishing marginal utility from
monetary goods creates risk aversion regarding
volatile tax payments, the diminishing marginal
utility from publicly provided goods creates risk
28Arrow and Lind, supra note 15, at 364.
29Harry Markowitz, ‘‘Portfolio Selection,’’ 7 J. of Fin. 77, 91
(1952).
30Stephen A. Ross, Neoclassical Finance 1 (2005).
31See, e.g., Kelly D. Edmiston, ‘‘Tax Uncertainty and
Investment: A Cross-Country Empirical Investigation,’’ 42
Econ. Inquiry 425 (2004).
However, some research has found that volatility in capital
income taxation can be welfare enhancing. See, e.g., Michael
Dotsey, ‘‘The Economic Effect of Production Taxes in a Sto-
chastic Growth Model,’’ 80 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1168 (1990);
David S. Bizer and Kenneth L. Judd, ‘‘Taxation and Uncer-
tainty,’’ 79 Amer. Econ. Rev. 331 (1989). See also James Alm,
‘‘Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare,’’
78 Amer. Econ. Rev. 237 (1988) (concluding that uncertainty
in the tax base may have positive welfare consequences, while
uncertainty in tax rates generally has negative welfare con-
sequences, as tax base uncertainty — but not tax rate
uncertainty — deters undesirable tax planning). But see Julie
H. Collins and Daniel P. Murphy, ‘‘Experimental Evidence of
the Effect of Tax Rate Uncertainty on Securities Prices,
Investor Clienteles, and Tax Payments,’’ 17 J. of Amer. Tax.
Assoc. 1 (1995) (‘‘These findings imply that prior litera-
ture . . . (e.g., Alm 1988) may overstate the welfare loss to
investors and the tax revenue loss to government as a result
of uncertainty. Our results indicate investors demand ‘com-
pensation’ for tax rate uncertainty and that this ‘risk premia’
leads to higher expected investor tax payments.’’).
32Kaplow, supra note 10, at 152, n.21; Matthew Rabin and
Richard H. Thaler, ‘‘Anomalies: Risk Aversion,’’ 15 J. of Econ.
Perspect, 219, (2001).
33Id. Rabin and Thaler argue that the standard view that
risk aversion arises from the diminishing marginal utility of
money cannot explain that individuals are averse to small
risks as well as to large risks. Instead, Rabin and Thaler
suggest that risk aversion results from the biases of loss
aversion and of mental accounting. There are also other
nonstandard theories for why individuals are averse to risk
and uncertainty. See, e.g., Yoram Halevy and Vincent Felt-
kamp, ‘‘A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion,’’ 72
Review of Econ. Stud. 449 (2005). But like the standard
model, the nonstandard explanations for risk aversion also
conclude that individuals exhibit increasing marginal risk
aversion. Hence, the nonstandard views are equally consis-
tent with the arguments of this paper, as is the standard
model. (Although we rely on the standard view of risk
aversion in the text of the report, because that is far more
widely accepted than the alternatives, we note as a tangent
that we are partially persuaded by Rabin and Thaler’s cri-
tique.)
34See Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Micro-
economics, 68-91 (2001).
35Id.
36Even billionaires may be frustrated by crime (lack of
police funding), traffic (lack of transportation spending), and
the like. Purchasing a private jet or one’s own security force
does not provide a perfect substitute.
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aversion to volatile government spending. No mat-
ter how much one values goods like public transpor-
tation or education, at some point adding more roads
and schools becomes less valuable than the private
consumption that must be forgone to pay for the nth
highway or school building.
Because of the diminishing marginal utility of
money, concentrated risks are more harmful than
dispersed risks. Risk spreading reduces the harm
from risk and uncertainty because each marginal
unit of risk affecting an individual or economic actor
is more harmful than the previous units. Therefore,
if two individuals are identical except that one bears
a high level of risk and the other a low level, then
transferring a unit of risk from the high-risk-
bearing individual to the low-risk-bearing indi-
vidual will reduce the total harm caused by the
risk.37 The feature that causes risk aversion — the
diminishing marginal utility of money — directly
justifies the principle of risk spreading.
B. The Harm From Planning Costs
In addition to the harm created by risk aversion,
fiscal volatility creates harm because of planning
costs. Risk aversion primarily affects consumption
— the degree to which individuals derive value from
economic goods. Risk aversion can also significantly
affect production, by discouraging risky behavior
that would have been expected to create value for
society.38 But those effects are secondary. In con-
trast, planning costs primarily concern production.
Individuals and firms often need to make invest-
ment decisions in the present to maximize produc-
tion in the future. Those decisions sometimes entail
sunk costs. For instance, students typically enroll in
law school so as to earn a salary from practicing law.
If the legal market later changes so that a student
can no longer find employment, the time and money
spent on law school are not refundable. Similarly,
firms make capital investments to generate future
revenues. If demand for a firm’s product evaporates,
the firm may be unable to recoup the invested
resources.
Public administrators must likewise make plan-
ning decisions in the presence of sunk costs. For
example, schools are built based on projected future
education spending. Uncertainty about how much
funding will be available for hiring teachers can lead
administrators to build schools that are either too
small or too large. Education suffers when too many
students are crammed into an overcrowded space,
but there is little point in having built more class-
rooms if funds do not permit hiring enough teachers
to use them.
Allocating fiscal volatility to expenditures can
force administrators to fire staff after putting them
through costly training programs, to abandon con-
struction projects that have already been partially
built, or to otherwise misallocate resources over
time and across types of expenses.39 In addition to
those primary costs, volatility in public spending
creates secondary costs that fall on the beneficiaries
of government programs and on any private-sector
individuals or contractors paid to work on the pro-
grams. If uncertain funding creates the possibility
that administrators will have to fire staff or stop
paying for contractors, the administrators will have
to pay more to hire the staff and contractors in order
to offset their risk premiums.40 Moreover, if the staff
or contractors incur sunk costs to make themselves
eligible for government work, volatile spending will
impose further costs on the staff and contractors
that will force the administrators to pay even more
in order to hire their services.41
Looking to program beneficiaries, spending vola-
tility can again impose costs even above the harm
caused by risk aversion. Individuals and firms often
make decisions based on reliance on government
programs. Those decisions can involve sunk costs.
For instance, firms decide where to build plants
based partially on the state of local roads and other
infrastructure. If spending is later cut so that the
infrastructure quality is no longer sufficient for the
firm’s purposes, the firm may have to abandon the
37That transfer would be efficient and welfare enhancing
following the Kaldor-Hicks method.
38As Kenneth Arrow explains, supra note 9, at 137-38, ‘‘at
any moment society is faced with a set of possible new
projects which are on the average profitable though one
cannot know for sure which particular projects will succeed
and which will fail. If risks cannot be shifted, then very
possibly none of the projects will be undertaken.’’ Volatility
can deter entrepreneurs and investors from taking on risks
that would be expected to improve societal welfare. Moreover,
firms as well as individuals can be risk averse. Arrow and
Lind, supra note 15, at 376. Both the managers of firms and
stockholders owning large blocks of shares can cause firms to
act in a risk-averse fashion. Consequently, by adding risk to
the economy, fiscal volatility can deter both firms and indi-
viduals from socially desirable entrepreneurial activities.
Although the additional risk caused by fiscal volatility is not
directly connected to entrepreneurial activities, it may com-
bine with the risk already inherent in those activities to deter
risk-taking behavior that would not have been deterred based
on the inherent risk alone.
39Just as planning costs can force administrators to fire
staff or abandon projects during downturns, during upturns
the administrators may find they have not previously hired
enough staff or started construction projects early enough,
and that surplus funds can thus not be used efficiently. See
Matthews, supra note 22, at 306.
40Supra note 38.
41For instance, students must apply for teacher training
programs at least a year or two in advance of seeking teaching
jobs. Because volatile spending makes the availability of
teaching jobs fluctuate significantly over time, that volatility
probably deters some students who would otherwise be in-
clined to enter the profession.
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plant or pay for expensive alternatives to the infra-
structure. Individuals face similar dilemmas if they
buy housing based on the quality of neighborhood
schools. And if firms structure their severance poli-
cies — or individuals make saving decisions— based
even partially on state-funded job retraining pro-
grams or unemployment benefits, any changes to
those benefits can leave individuals worse off than if
they had been able to make decisions in anticipation
of the changes.
Fiscal volatility thus creates significant planning
costs whether allocated to taxes or to public spend-
ing. Just as public administrators plan based on
expectations about their future budgets, taxpayers
make planning decisions based on expected future
returns, and volatility in taxes creates uncertainty
in those returns. If a tax increase makes an eco-
nomic activity unprofitable after taxes, the activity
may have to be abandoned even if nonrefundable
resources have already been expended on the activ-
ity.42 Plus, as with spending, volatility in taxes also
imposes secondary costs on the beneficiaries of
private-sector projects and on anyone hired or con-
tracted to work on those projects. If a store closes
because it is unprofitable after taxes, anyone who
worked at the store or who planned on purchasing
needed items from the store will also suffer.
In reference to planning costs, the risk-spreading
principle depends on the conclusion of increasing
marginal planning costs. All else being equal, a
$2,000 loss of public funding or increase in a tax bill
should create more than twice as much harm from
planning costs as a $1,000 funding loss or tax
increase.
Whether they operate in the public or private
sectors, individuals and organizations generally
maintain some level of reserves — or slack — that
can be used to meet unexpected challenges.43 For
individuals, that slack can include previously saved
funds, the ability to temporarily increase work ef-
fort, favors that can be called in from friends and
family, and anything else the individual can do to
cope with a negative shock without abandoning
sunk resources. Similarly, organizations can ask
their employees to work harder for short periods,
can temporarily reduce employee benefits or over-
head, or can engage in a variety of similar coping
mechanisms.
Because individuals and organizations have only
finite levels of slack, the planning costs associated
with fiscal volatility should generate increasing
marginal harm. Whereas small amounts of volatility
can often be dealt with through reserves, increasing
levels of volatility will at some point exhaust avail-
able reserves and thus force the abandonment of
sunk resources, thereby creating far larger marginal
costs.
Furthermore, even after reserves have been ex-
pended, we might reasonably expect organizations
and individuals to first abandon projects with few
sunk costs and to only later abandon projects with
greater sunk costs. The ability of economic actors to
allocate the costs of volatility across subprojects
should further cause volatility to generate increas-
ing marginal planning costs.
Just as the diminishing marginal utility of money
justifies the risk-spreading principle regarding risk
aversion, the presence of increasing marginal plan-
ning costs justifies the risk-spreading principle re-
garding planning costs. In both cases, transferring a
unit of risk from an actor facing significant addi-
tional risks to an actor facing few additional risks
will reduce the harm caused by that unit of risk,
because additional units of risk are more harmful on
the margin.
III. Conducting an Applied Risk Analysis for
Fiscal Volatility
As the previous section explained, risk spreading
can mitigate the harms caused by both risk aversion
and planning costs — the two major harms from
fiscal volatility. Hence, as a general rule, the optimal
method for coping with fiscal volatility is likely to be
the method that best accomplishes risk spreading.
The optimal method for coping
with fiscal volatility is likely to be
the method that best accomplishes
risk spreading.
This section argues that maximal risk spreading
is accomplished when fiscal volatility is dealt with
primarily by adjusting the rates of broad-based
taxes. This argument is demonstrated first by com-
paring the risk-bearing characteristics of taxpayers
with the risk-bearing characteristics of the benefi-
ciaries of public spending, and second by comparing
the risk-bearing characteristics of public spending
activities with those of private-sector economic ac-
tivities.
42By ‘‘unprofitable’’ we mean unprofitable in the economic
sense — a project becomes unprofitable if the resources that
must still be invested in order to complete the project could
yield greater returns if diverted to an alternative use (the
opportunity costs of continuing the project exceed the ex-
pected gains).
43See, e.g., Joseph L.C. Cheng and Idalene F. Kesner,
‘‘Organizational Slack and Environmental Shifts: The Impact
of Resource Allocation Patterns,’’ 23 J. of Management 1
(1997); Jitendra V. Singh, ‘‘Performance, Slack, and Risk
Taking in Organizational Decision Making,’’ 29 Academy of
Management J 562 (1986).
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A. Comparing Taxpayers With the
Beneficiaries of Public Spending
When fiscal volatility is resolved by fluctuating
tax rates, the harmful effects of the volatility fall on
taxpayers. Conversely, when fiscal volatility is re-
solved by fluctuating spending, the harmful effects
of the volatility fall on the beneficiaries of public
spending programs. To a large degree, those catego-
ries overlap, because every citizen of a state both
pays taxes and benefits from public spending.44 Yet
those groups do not overlap perfectly. Some state
citizens will receive more net benefit (from spending
minus taxes) than will others.
Taken as a whole, state fiscal policy is redistribu-
tive on the margin. Many states’ tax systems are
considered regressive in that they take a higher
percentage of poor taxpayers’ incomes than they do
of rich taxpayers’ incomes.45 For instance, sales
taxes are considered regressive because poor tax-
payers typically spend a higher percentage of their
income than do rich taxpayers. Nevertheless, in
every state, marginal spending is sufficiently pro-
gressive so as to more than make up for these
regressive taxes.
As mentioned earlier, three-quarters of state gen-
eral account spending falls into four major catego-
ries: elementary and secondary education (36 per-
cent), Medicaid and other public assistance (19
percent), higher education (12 percent), and correc-
tions (7 percent).46 Of those, Medicaid and public
assistance are clearly progressive in that they pri-
marily benefit poor taxpayers. Moving to the educa-
tion categories, even though the wealthy often ben-
efit more from education spending than the poor,
tax-funded education spending is still highly pro-
gressive. The reason is that education dollars are
not distributed as unequally as is income. Even if a
rich taxpayer with an annual income of $200,000
derives twice as much value from education spend-
ing as a poor taxpayer with an annual income of
$20,000, as a percent of income, the poor taxpayer
still receives five times as much benefit as the rich
taxpayer.
The key to the above example is that progressiv-
ity in taxes is usually measured as a percent of
income, while the redistributive quality of spending
is usually measured in dollar amounts. Even ‘‘re-
gressive’’ sales taxes take far more in dollars from
rich taxpayers than from poor taxpayers. Although
education spending might provide more absolute
benefit to the rich than to the poor, that disparity is
unlikely to be so large as to overpower the greater
dollar amounts the rich are paying in taxes. For
almost all forms of state spending, raising taxes by
$1 to fund an additional dollar of spending should
redistribute resources from rich taxpayers to poor
taxpayers.
Of the four major categories of state general
account spending, only corrections might be an ex-
ception to that rule. Spending on prisons and law
enforcement arguably benefits the rich far more
than the poor, perhaps enough to overwhelm the
differences in tax dollars paid. Following similar
logic, it is often argued that the wealthy derive far
more benefit from government spending as a whole
than do the poor, because there would be little or no
wealth without government (in the state of na-
ture).47 Yet while that argument might be valid for
state expenditures as a whole, its logic fails when
considering state expenditures on the margin. When
examining the types of spending that are actually
cut during downturns and increased during up-
turns, it seems clear that marginal spending in-
creases benefit the poor more than the wealthy. Most
spending fluctuations are in the categories of Medic-
aid and other public assistance, higher education,
and elementary and secondary education. Raising
taxes by a couple percentage points to fund addi-
tional spending in those areas almost certainly ben-
efits the poor more than the wealthy.48
Hence, allocating volatility to taxes causes the
effects of the volatility to fall more on wealthy
taxpayers, and allocating volatility to spending
44Although not every citizen receives direct payments from
a state, every citizen benefits to at least some extent from
spending programs funding transportation infrastructure,
education, the criminal justice system, and the like.
45See Robert Landry, ‘‘The Regressivity of Individual State
Taxes from 1980 to 2000: A Nationwide Comparison,’’ avail-
able at http://www.nmtri.org/associations/3740/files/Regres
sivityPaperWithTables_STN_July2006_LANDRY.pdf.
46Supra note 21. Again, this paper discusses only state
general account spending because that is the spending sub-
ject to balanced budget constraints. Spending funded by the
states’ capital budgets is not usually cut during downturns.
47See, e.g., Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership
(2002); Joseph Dodge, ‘‘Theories of Tax Justice, Ruminations
on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability to Pay Principles,’’ 58
Tax. L. Rev. 399 (2005).
48For an exception that helps demonstrate the general
rule, this result might not apply if the taxes raised to fund the
additional spending were head taxes — taxes that take the
same dollar amount from each taxpayer. Or, somewhat more
plausibly, if only user fees and licenses were raised to pay for
additional spending, those revenue sources might be suffi-
ciently regressive so as to make the net effect nonredistribu-
tive. But for the major broad-based state taxes (for example,
sales taxes, income taxes, and property taxes), raising the tax
rates for these taxes on the margin to fund additional state
spending in the major state spending categories will almost
certainly be redistributive.
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causes the effects of the volatility to fall more on
poor taxpayers. To make that observation into a
normative argument, we need only conclude that
volatility causes less overall harm when allocated to
wealthy taxpayers than when allocated to poorer
taxpayers.
The first argument supporting this conclusion
examines the direct risk-spreading effects of redis-
tributing volatility. Remember that both risk aver-
sion and planning costs create increasing marginal
harm. Each additional unit of volatility creates more
harm from both risk aversion and from planning
costs than did the previous units. For risk aversion,
harm increases on the margin due to the diminish-
ing marginal utility of money. For planning costs,
harm increases on the margin because of finite slack
resulting in increasing marginal planning costs.
Even ‘regressive’ sales taxes take
far more in dollars from rich
taxpayers than from poor
taxpayers.
If we look first to risk aversion, the diminishing
marginal utility of money means that any given
amount of risk will be more harmful when allocated
to an individual with more money and less harmful
when allocated to an individual with less money. To
illustrate, for a taxpayer with an annual income of
$10,000, the possibility of that income going up by
$2,000 or down by $2,000 constitutes a large risk.
Yet if that same risk is instead allocated to another
taxpayer with an annual income of $200,000, the
risk becomes much smaller as a percentage of in-
come. The first taxpayer would have to significantly
change her consumption portfolio in response to
having 20 percent less income. In contrast, the
second taxpayer would be far less affected by the
possible need to decrease her consumption by only 1
percent. If the two taxpayers are otherwise identical
— except for their different monetary resources —
the first taxpayer stands to lose far more expected
utility from the volatility than does the second
taxpayer.49
A similar result follows for planning costs, as long
as there is a connection between an individual’s
monetary resources and her level of slack or re-
serves. Although that connection is obviously not
perfect, when abstracting across an entire state
population, it seems reasonable to conclude that
those with higher income levels will also have more
slack built into their budgets.50 After all, the more
income one has, the more one spends, and the more
opportunity there is to reallocate one’s resources
across spending categories when faced with a down-
turn. Hence, the planning costs caused by fiscal
volatility are also likely to be more harmful when
allocated to poor taxpayers than when allocated to
wealthier taxpayers.
The indirect risk-spreading effects of redistribut-
ing fiscal volatility function much like the direct
planning cost effects.51 Indirect risk spreading oc-
curs when volatility is allocated to individuals who
are better able to save, borrow, or use third-party
insurance. Through saving during upturns (and
using the saved funds to maintain consumption
during downturns), an individual can smooth her
consumption over time and thus mitigate the harm-
ful effects of fiscal volatility. Borrowing during
downturns (and paying off the borrowing during
upturns), likewise accomplishes consumption
smoothing to mitigate the harmful effects of fiscal
volatility. Finally, the use of third-party insurance
transfers volatility from the insured individual to
other economic actors (who may reside out of state).
Empirically, compared with poor taxpayers,
wealthier taxpayers are both more able and more
likely to save during upturns, borrow during down-
turns, and purchase third-party insurance. It is well
known that the wealthy tend to save more than the
poor and thus have greater savings available to
smooth consumption during downturns.52 The
wealthy do not necessarily borrow more than the
poor, but they have a greater ability to access capital
markets if they wish to do so.53 Finally, although
directly purchasing insurance against downturns is
not common, the wealthy can effectively purchase
49Stated more formally, the utility loss that would be
experienced by the first taxpayer is higher than the utility
loss that would be experienced by the second taxpayer, as the
utility-to-dollar values are higher for the first taxpayer than
for the second taxpayer.
50The move here is similar to the logic typically used to
justify making interpersonal utility comparisons based on the
diminishing marginal utility of money. There may well be
some wealthy taxpayer who derives more utility from a
marginal dollar than does some poor taxpayer, but when
abstracting across an entire population, it seems reasonable
to conclude that wealthy taxpayers as a class will derive less
utility from a marginal dollar than will poor taxpayers as a
class. Similarly, the wealthy taxpayers as a class should have
more slack.
51Indeed, the direct planning cost effects and the indirect
risk-spreading effects are perhaps inextricably intertwined,
as borrowing, saving, and the use of third-party insurance are
all mechanisms for indirect risk spreading and also forms of
slack.
52Richard Blundell, Luigi Pistaferri, and Ian Preston,
‘‘Partial Insurance, Information, and Consumption Dynam-
ics,’’ available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ifs/ifsewp/02-16
.html.
53See Ronald Mann and Jim Hawkins, ‘‘Just Until Pay-
day,’’ 54 UCLA L. Rev. 855, 886-895 (2007); Michael Barr,
‘‘Banking the Poor,’’ 21 Yale J. of Regulation 121 (2004).
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insurance through the use of options, derivatives,
annuities, and other financial instruments.54
Consequently, both direct and indirect risk
spreading is accomplished by redistributing volatil-
ity from the poor to the wealthy. Because state tax
and spending programs are redistributive on the
margin, fluctuating tax rates as the primary re-
sponse to fiscal volatility accomplishes more risk
spreading than does fluctuating spending levels.
B. Comparing Public Spending Activities
With Private-Sector Economic Activities
When comparing taxpayers with the beneficiaries
of public spending programs, the focus is on differ-
ences among individual state citizens. Yet it is also
possible to examine the risk-spreading effects of
responses to fiscal volatility from the perspective of
a representative taxpayer. Even if all state citizens
were identical — or if state fiscal policy was not
redistributive — fluctuating tax rates would accom-
plish more risk spreading than would fluctuating
spending levels.
As a starting point, we might think that the
principle of risk spreading would call for fiscal
volatility to be allocated to public spending pro-
grams rather than to private-sector economic activi-
ties. After all, downturns occur when the private
sector is already suffering because of economic vola-
tility. Shouldn’t some of that volatility be allocated
to the public sector through spending reductions
(and tax cuts)?
Although the intuition behind this argument is
correct, the argument is nonetheless misguided.
Certainly, public-sector spending should not be com-
pletely shielded from the effects of volatility. Spend-
ing cuts will likely form a portion of the optimal
response to volatility during downturns. However,
this intuition ignores the fact that — if tax rates are
held constant — a 1 percent reduction in private-
sector economic activity results in a considerably
more than 1 percent reduction in tax revenue. Ac-
cording to one estimate for the combined 50 states,
excluding legislative changes, each 1 percent de-
viation in GDP growth below its trend reduces total
state revenue by 2.5 percent.55
The reason that tax revenue is several times more
volatile than state economic activity is that the
underlying tax base is not overall state economic
activity. Instead, the tax bases for most of the major
state-level taxes are considerably more volatile than
is state economic activity. Most dramatically,
business-level income taxes are incurred only when
businesses earn profits.56 During an economic down-
turn, many businesses will show losses or only
minimal profits and thus will not pay significant
business-level income taxes. The same phenomenon
holds to a lesser extent for individual income taxes
(particularly for the self-employed). Deductions are
likely to remain steady during downturns, while
gross earnings decrease, leading to a reduction in
taxable income. Moreover, for states that tax capital
gains, taxpayers will tend to realize more losses
during downturns and more gains during upturns.
Even state sales taxes are typically more volatile
than overall economic activity, because state sales
taxes tend to exempt services that are more heavily
consumed during downturns and often exempt other
necessary items like food and medical expenses.57
The manufactured consumer goods that are most
heavily taxed under most state sales tax systems
tend to be purchased more during upturns than in
downturns.
Hence, with the notable exception of property
taxes, the major state tax systems are all consider-
ably more volatile than overall state economic activ-
ity.58 On average, state tax revenue has been esti-
mated to be 2.5 times more volatile than gross state
products.59 In states like California that rely heavily
on income taxes and capital gains taxes, the ratio is
even more extreme.60
Direct risk spreading is achieved when volatility
is spread as widely as possible across individuals or
sectors of the economy. All else being equal, the
direct risk-spreading principle would thus call for
fiscal volatility to be allocated across the public and
private sectors in proportion to the size of both
sectors as a percent of gross state product. Yet
without tax rate adjustments, the public sector in a
typical state will be forced to absorb more than twice
as much volatility as the private sector. To correct
that imbalance, tax rates must be adjusted as the
54The number of individuals insuring through those
methods is probably small, but there is no doubt that those
techniques are more available to the wealthy than to the
poor.
55Brinner et al., supra note 22, at 60-63.
56In contrast, a gross receipts tax or a VAT would be due
regardless of profitability.
57See Kirk Stark, ‘‘The Uneasy Case for Extending the
Sales Tax to Services,’’ 30 Florida St. L. Rev. 435 (2003).
58For a more in-depth discussion of the factors inherent in
state-level tax systems that contribute to revenue volatility
exceeding of economic volatility, see Russell S. Sobel and Gary
A. Wagner, ‘‘Cyclical Variability in State Government Rev-
enue: Can Tax Reform Reduce It?’’ State Tax Notes, Aug. 25,
2003, p. 569, Doc 2003-19091, or 2003 STT 164-2.
59Brinner et al., supra note 22, at 60-63.
60Jon David Vasche and Brad Williams, ‘‘Revenue Volatil-
ity in California,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr. 4, 2005, p. 35, Doc
2005-4744, or 2005 STT 63-2.
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economy cycles, with rates being raised during
downturns and lowered during upturns.
Without tax rate adjustments, the
public sector in a typical state will
be forced to absorb more than
twice as much volatility as the
private sector.
Moreover, the principle of indirect risk spreading
calls for an even further reallocation of volatility
away from the public sector and toward the private
sector. The principle of indirect risk spreading sup-
ports allocating volatility to actors who are better
able to save, borrow, insure, or efficiently reallocate
volatility across subprograms. Private-sector eco-
nomic activities are more able to engage in all those
methods for mitigating the harmful effects of vola-
tility than are public-sector spending programs.
To begin with, legal constraints limit the ability of
public-sector administrations to engage in borrow-
ing.61 Those constraints do not always preclude
borrowing, but they often place burdensome limita-
tions — such as the need to seek voter approval —
that are not similarly placed on private-sector man-
agers.62
Public-sector administrators are less legally
constrained in their ability to save or insure, but the
political dynamics of the budgeting process create
strong incentives against their doing so. The
budgets for public-sector programs are set politi-
cally, whereas private-sector budgets are often
determined — either directly or indirectly — by the
market. Consequently, public-sector managers are
trained to always demonstrate the need for more
funding to protect their budgets.63 Saving and
insuring are not usually possible within the
dynamics of that budgeting game.
The political budgeting game also interferes with
the ability of public-sector managers to efficiently
allocate the effects of volatility across subprograms.
When budgets are cut during downturns, public-
sector managers face incentives to allocate those
cuts to politically salient portions of their budget, in
an attempt to protect their budgets during subse-
quent rounds of cuts.64 Often, that dynamic means
that cuts will be allocated to the budget areas in
which they are most costly, rather than to the budget
lines that can absorb the cuts most efficiently.
Of course, large businesses are not completely
immune to politics or to budgeting games of the sort
that pervade public-sector spending. But there is
usually better oversight within private-sector orga-
nizations, and the harmful effects of those political
dynamics are tempered by the motivating force of
market competition. Even the most liberal econo-
mists will generally agree that the private sector is
more efficient at producing goods and services, ex-
cept for public goods that would not be produced
without government. The same market forces that
make the private sector more efficient than govern-
ment production — and that more generally justify
capitalism as a means of economic ordering — also
lead the private sector to be more efficient at miti-
gating the harmful effects of economic volatility.
The same market forces that make
the private sector more efficient
than government production lead
the private sector to be more
efficient at mitigating the harmful
effects of economic volatility.
As an example of how budgetary politics can
exacerbate the harm from spending fluctuations,
political dynamics frequently lead to state social
insurance programs bearing a disproportionate
share of budget cuts during downturns.65 Those
programs are especially poor candidates for absorb-
ing the harmful effects of fiscal volatility. State
social insurance programs are intended to mitigate
the risk of economic misfortune by assisting tax-
payers during periods of particular hardship. To
function effectively, those programs thus need to
spend more resources during economic downturns,
because those are the periods in which potential
program recipients are especially likely to have
suffered hardship. Unfortunately, the historical
practice of cutting spending during downturns and
increasing spending during upturns has led state
governments to reduce funding for social insurance
programs during periods of economic adversity, only
to restore funding during periods of strong economic
growth.
61See Super, supra note 22, at 2605-2607; Richard Brif-
fault, ‘‘Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal
Limits and State Constitutional Law,’’ 34 Rutgers L. J. 907,
915-918 (2003).
62Id.
63See, e.g., David Fligio and Arthur O’Sullivan, ‘‘The Local
Response to Tax Limitation Measures: Do Local Governments
Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?’’ 44 J. of Law and
Economics 233 (2001).
64Id.
65The analysis here partially draws on the writings of
Super, supra note 22, at 2562-2613. Note that although some
of those programs could theoretically be funded by the mar-
ket, moral hazard problems may make governments more
efficient providers of these programs.
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It would be silly to purchase an umbrella that
functions only during sunny days. Depriving fund-
ing to social insurance programs during downturns
and increasing funding during upturns is equally
silly. An essential purpose of those programs is to
insure against risks; introducing uncertainty to that
insurance function makes the insurance consider-
ably less valuable. When spending levels fluctuate,
many potential social insurance beneficiaries with
strong needs are denied assistance during down-
turns, while less needy recipients are provided ben-
efits during upturns.
Comparing public-sector spending activities with
private-sector economic activities thus further re-
veals that tax rate adjustments accomplish greater
risk spreading than do spending fluctuations. In-
creasing the use of tax rate adjustments as state
economies cycle would reduce some of the harm
caused by fiscal volatility.
IV. Conclusions and Caveats
Both when comparing taxpayers with spending
beneficiaries and when comparing private-sector
economic activities with public-sector spending, the
result is the same. Adjusting tax rates accomplishes
more risk spreading than does adjusting govern-
ment spending levels. Moreover, the normative force
of those arguments is cumulative. From a baseline of
allocating fiscal volatility equally to tax and spend-
ing adjustments, each argument pushes the opti-
mum further toward the direction of larger tax rate
adjustments and smaller spending fluctuations.
Nevertheless, the optimal response to fiscal vola-
tility is likely to include some amount of spending
fluctuations. The harm from allocating risk to any
individual actor increases on the margin. The argu-
ments here support allocating the majority of vola-
tility to tax rate adjustments, but at some point,
continually increasing the magnitude of tax rate
adjustments will cause more harm than would
maintaining some degree of spending fluctuations.
This article makes no attempt to quantify its
risk-spreading arguments. Instead, it merely argues
that tax rate adjustments should form the primary
response to fiscal volatility. Whether ‘‘primary’’
means 60 percent of coping responses or 90 percent
is left for future research.
Moreover, both the optimal amount of tax rate
adjustments and the choice of which taxes to adjust
depend on structural features of state economies.
The degree to which taxpayers are likely to relocate
across state lines or play timing games across tax
years in response to tax hikes is an important factor
in determining the desirability of tax rate adjust-
ments for those groups. In deciding which taxes to
adjust, states will often face a dilemma in which the
taxes most affecting upper-income taxpayers (for
example, progressive income taxes and capital gains
taxes) are the most likely to be avoided through
relocation or timing games. Yet many of the advan-
tages of selecting tax rate adjustments over spend-
ing fluctuations derive from progressivity. This re-
port has argued that even adjusting the rates of a
regressive tax like the sales tax to avoid spending
fluctuations is beneficial to lower-income taxpayers,
but the risk-spreading advantages of adjusting sales
tax rates are less than those of adjusting the rates of
more progressive taxes.
One approach for balancing those competing con-
siderations would be to create a new statewide
property tax that could be adjusted to have positive
tax rates during downturns (so as to offset the
reduced revenue being generated by other state tax
instruments) while providing a tax refund during
upturns. The new property tax could include circuit
breakers to increase its progressivity.66
The desirability of creating a new statewide prop-
erty tax compared with other methods for enacting
tax rate adjustments is a question largely left for
future research. For now, it suffices to reiterate that
not all tax rate adjustments accomplish risk spread-
ing. This article has examined only the trade-offs
between allocating volatility to broad-based tax rate
adjustments compared with across-the-board spend-
ing adjustments.67 The questions of how best to
allocate tax rate adjustments among the various
state tax instruments, and how best to allocate
spending adjustments among state spending pro-
grams, are likewise left for future research. ✰
66See John H. Bowman, Daphne A. Kenyon, Adam Lan-
gley, and Bethany P. Paquin, ‘‘Property Tax Circuit Breakers
and Cost-Effective Relief,’’ State Tax Notes, July 27, 2009, p.
235, Doc 2009-12640, or 2009 STT 141-3.
67Another possible approach for coping with fiscal volatil-
ity is to broaden tax bases during downturns while narrowing
them during upturns. That approach is similar to adjusting
tax rates in that it results in tax burdens fluctuating across
the economic cycle, but it accomplishes that through a differ-
ent mechanism. However, broadening and narrowing a tax
base will generally be suboptimal from a risk-spreading
perspective. Changing the elements of a tax base typically
affects a much narrower group of taxpayers than does adjust-
ing the rates of the tax instrument, thus causing the effects of
volatility to be more concentrated. Also, adjusting the el-
ements of a tax base is likely to engender more undesirable
game playing on the part of taxpayers than would adjusting
tax rates.
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